In long history of Japan, there has been no other era than today just in opening of the 21st century when we ordinary citizens are facing multiple threats. The immediate threats that we face are large-scale natural disasters, accidents and terrorism. The Great East Japan Earthquake which occurred on March 11 was a large-scale disaster that brought about massive damage through the earthquake and resulting tsunami, which also caused a nuclear accident and damaged Japan's reputation. Measures are still being taken to stabilize the nuclear power plant accident, and this will likely requires many years endeavor and great caution. Although most Japanese people believe that a terrorist attack will not happen in Japan, the sarin gas attack on Tokyo's subway in 1995 was not merely an incident but rather should be viewed as the world's first large-scale chemical terrorist attack. The accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant has also revealed that a large-scale nuclear accident can be caused without directly damaging the nuclear reactor itself by severing the power line that provides electricity to the reactor. This in turn has made it clear to the world that power lines connecting a nuclear reactor could be a target for terrorist groups.

The threat that should be estimated as a medium-term time frame is the accidental discharge of neighboring countries' military power to prevent own country from self collapse. For Japan, this refers to the emergence of "North Korea who possesses nuclear and ballistic missiles". Although it is the national government's responsibility to protect its citizens from the threat of ballistic missiles, local authorities also carry a grave responsibility in keeping routes that allow missile defense units to quickly approach the city center area and in securing space to deploy units. Under a new leadership regime prepared in the post Kim Jong-il era, North Korea has begun condensing uranium essential to creating nuclear weapons and shelled South Korea's Yeonpyeong island in the vicinity of the northern limit line (NLL), as if driven by a need to demonstrate its new leadership to the people of North Korea. Given these facts, just as ballistic missile evacuation drills are being practiced in South Korea's capital city of Seoul, agencies responsible for crisis management in Tokyo should also start preparing for the potential of a sudden ballistic missile attack on Tokyo, however unlikely it may seem. It is the first time in history that Japan is faced with such a serious threat that its capital can be reduced to ashes within minutes of a button being pushed.

The threat that should be estimated in a long-term time frame is the indirect threat of changes in the global strategic environment that threatens Japan's national security in the result. This is not an imminent threat, but rather a long-term threat. Amid instability in the Middle East where Japan depends on nearly all of its energy demand, and explosive increases of demand for food and energy from Brazil, Russia, India and China (or BRICs), we have begun to foresee a nightmare that the entire planet might thrust into a battle to secure natural resources. Although major cities will be faced with the major challenge of securing stable supplies of energy, food and water, these situations should be essentially managed by the national government, and not one that local authorities should be required to prepare for directly.

The Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11 shed light on both the extraordinary nature of Japan as a country and its fragile national structure built up in the post war era, which until now the people of Japan has not been aware of on a daily basis. The patience of people living in evacuation centers, the thoughtful and orderly actions of those who affected by the disaster, the mayors, police officers, fire fighters, doctors and nurses who stayed helping others until the end without running away in the face of the approaching tsunami only to be washed away and lost, and the dedication shown by workers and engineers who are even now battling to control the reactor on site of the nuclear accident while being exposed to high levels of radiation have each once again caused us to take notice of the extraordinary nature of Japan's society.

The other thing that became clear as a result of 3.11 was the extraordinary nature and value of the Japan Self-Defense Forces' underlying strengths, which until 3.11 had been consistently reticent approach since its establishment. The five characteristics known as the true value of the Japan Self-Defense Forces are immediate response to emergency situations, self-sufficiency, massive deployment capabilities, special equipment and skills as well as the collaborative US-Japan framework, were properly leveraged, while the ironclad rules of troop management in a rescue operation, such as unity of command and rapid deployment, were followed. Moreover, the quick deployment of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit (CNBC); which possesses skills and capabilities in measuring and decontaminating radiation and measuring temperature (thermograph, etc.), to a location near the site of the nuclear accident proved to be extremely effective in dealing with the crisis.

The Great East Japan Earthquake clearly disclosed the vulnerabilities of Japan's crisis management framework (laws, organization, training, human resource development, and leadership) on both a national and local level. It also signaled the need for a major change in direction of Japan's approaches on a national and local level, which until now had only been policy decisions known as "selection and concentration" only to gain the favor of citizens and had neglected effort allocation for crisis management due to an excessive quest for cost-effectiveness.

In terms of laws, the Emergency Basic Law, which can switch the national government and local authorities from ordinary mode to crisis mode only when a large-scale disaster or crisis occurs, has yet to be developed. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which examined the Fukushima nuclear accident, pointed out the following in terms of organization. The bottom-up Japan-type organization used under normal situations that stresses the collection of opinions, mutual coordination and consensus building is too complex and cannot function during crisis management in an emergency, which requires quick top down decision making, while Japan lacks a effective system to transfer authority to the necessary local sites l in an emergency.

In terms of training, conducting small-scale training on multiple occasions still makes it near impossible to simulate experiences and learn the same lessons from large-scale training. Structured trainings such as with publicized scenario should be avoided. Regarding human resource development, it is important to cultivate not only experts in crisis management but also human resources among ordinary citizens that can act as small group leaders (for example, someone who is a licensed fire fighter). As for leadership, the IAEA pointed out that information disclosures from the government and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) regarding the Fukushima nuclear accident was inadequate. In a rush to emphasize safety and security to avoid a mass panic, the response of the government and TEPCO resulted in a negative cycle that actually caused more concern and fear among the people than it alleviated. Whatever the case, since it requires much time, the building of a crisis management framework should not be considered a far future problem for local authorities, but certainly" a battle against time".

Another lesson the Great East Japan Earthquake has taught us is the importance of international cooperation in the aftermath of a large-scale disaster. A total of 142 countries and regions and 39 international organizations extended assistance to Japan on this occasion, while 17 of these countries dispatched rescue teams to the disaster zone. There is no way to quantify the sense of encouragement that this assistance instilled in the hearts of those that stood paralyzed in the wake of this tragedy.

I sincerely hope that moving forward we can continue to share our knowledge and experiences together through the Asian Network of Major Cities21 (ANMC21) and mutually enhance the skill with those who are in charge of crisis management in the major cities of Asia. (End)